Pace Law Review
Volume 27
Issue 2 Winter 2007

Article 6

January 2007

The BRAC Act, the State Militia Charade, and the Disregard of
Original Intent
Nathan Zezula

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
Part of the Military, War, and Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
Nathan Zezula, The BRAC Act, the State Militia Charade, and the Disregard of Original Intent, 27
Pace L. Rev. 365 (2007)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol27/iss2/6
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more
information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

The BRAC Act, the State Militia Charade,
and the Disregard of Original Intent
Nathan Zezula*
Introduction
This article will discuss a body of cases represented by Rell
v. Rumsfeld' and its place as the latest development in the
evolution of the colonial militia into the present day National
Guard. The first part of the article will discuss the general legal trend away from state control of the militia and toward total
federal control. The second part will discuss the Base Realignment and Closure Act (hereinafter the "BRAC Act"). The third
part will discuss the case of Rendell v. Rumsfeld 2 as representative of the most complete discussion of the impact of the BRAC
Act on the control of the National Guard by the judiciary. The
fourth part will then look at the legal origins and development
of the National Guard. Finally, in part five, the article will discuss the possible outcomes and resulting implications of Rell
and the accompanying cases.
* J.D. Candidate 2007, Pace University School of Law; B.A., Tulane University, 1998. Served on active duty as an officer in the U.S. Army, branched Field
Artillery, 1998-2002. Thanks to Tiffany, Jackson, and Bean.
1. Rell v. Rumsfeld, 389 F. Supp. 2d 395 (D. Conn 2005). This lawsuit, filed by
the Governor Jodi Rell of Connecticut against Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, challenges the Secretary's power to recommend to the President the removal
of all National Guard aircraft form the 103rd fighter wing. Governor Rell claimed
that the removal of the aircraft amounted to a reorganization of the unit, a power
reserved for the state governor by 32 U.S.C. § 104(c). Rumsfeld argued that the
BRAC Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2687, authorized him to make the recommendation. The
trial court held for Governor Rell, and enjoined the Secretary. On appeal, the Second Circuit granted a stay on the grounds that the issue was not ripe. Rell v.
Rumsfeld, 423 F.3d 164, 164 (2d Cir. 2005).
2. Rendell v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-CV-3563, 2005 WL 2050295, at *17 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 26, 2005). In this suit, Governor Edward Rendell of Pennsylvania challenged
the Secretary of Defense's recommendation to "deactivate" the 111th Fighter
Wing. The court found that the Secretary of Defense failed to obtain Governor
Rendell's approval before deactivating a unit of the National Guard. As the Secretary failed to obtain this approval, the court found the recommendation "null and
void." Id. at *9.
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The Steady March Toward Federalism

The state militia has been a part of the American identity
since before the United States was a nation. 3 The image of the
Minuteman opposing the British regulars at Lexington and
Concord is an integral part of our national identity. At the birth
of the nation, the militia was our army and our defense, the
means by which we secured our independence. Over the last
two centuries, the militia has been budgeted, legislated,
amended, and judicially interpreted into its twenty-first cen4
tury manifestation as the National Guard.
The change in the organization, equipment, and mission of
5
the militia over the years was both foreseeable and necessary.
Our national objectives as the sole global superpower require a
different military and a different militia than the one that pro6
vided for frontier defense against the Indians and the British.
This natural development has kept the militia concept of the
7
citizen soldier relevant into the modern era.
However, another area of change in the militia that is
troubling to many is the dramatic shift in the control of the militia. In the eighteenth century, the militia was the jealously
guarded province of the colonies, and later the states. The
power of the states over the militia was set out in the Constitution under the Militia Clauses.8 These clauses reserve specific
and limited powers for the federal government, mostly in time
of war, and leave control over the militia to the states in peace3. See Alan Hirsch, The Militia Clauses of the Constitutionand the National
Guard, 56 U. CiN. L. REV. 919, 923 (1988); see also Patrick Todd Mullins, The Militia Clauses, The National Guard, and Federalism:A ConstitutionalTug Of War, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 328, 329 (1988) ("Prior to 1787, [the militia] was a product of
English common law.").
4. "The National Guard is the modern Militia reserved to the States by article
I, s. 8, cl.15, 16 of the Constitution." Maryland ex rel. Levin v. United States, 381
U.S. 41, 46 (1965) (vacated on other grounds). Throughout this article, the term
"National Guard" will refer to both elements of the dual nature of the organization.
Normally, the National Guard functions as the descendant of the state militia, as
the State Guard. When placed on federal active duty, the same soldiers and units
become the federal Reserve force, as the National Guard of the United States.
5. See Mullins, supra note 3, at 341.
6. Id. at 341.
7. Id.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15, 16.
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time. 9 In effect, the state governor was originally the commander in chief of an independent army, with only the
obligation to answer the call of the President in time of war.
Currently, in the twenty-first century, the state governors'
power over the state Guard troops, even in peacetime, is largely
ceremonial.' 0 The list of remaining functions of state governors
can now easily be exclusively listed. State governors retain the
function to:
accept allotments of military personnel and equipment from the
Department of Defense for the . . . National Guard; carry out
training for the ... National Guard; establish the location of any

assigned, authorized, units of the... National Guard; organize or
reorganize any unit of the ...

National Guard; Place the .

.

. Na-

tional Guard on active duty during an emergency in [his state];
and appoint commissioned officers and warrant officers of the...
National Guard."
As anemic as this list appears, the actual powers of state
governors are limited still further. The first "power," that of accepting allotments of military personnel and equipment from
the federal government, can hardly be called a power, burdened
as it is with extensive federal requirements, such as the opening of all property books to federal oversight and of all ledgers to
federal accounting. 12 The power to train the National Guard is
so controlled by the federal government and so linked to federal
funds that any real control over substantive training was legislated away from the states with the Dick Act of 1903.13 Similarly, the power to establish the kind and number of assigned,
authorized units of the National Guard has been legislated
away from the states: 14 since 1916, the federal government has
dictated the kind and number of units each state must maintain. 15 The federal government prohibits states from maintain9. Id.
10. Mullins, supra note 3, at 332 (the National Guard is now "governed in
part" by federal statute).
11. Rendell v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-CV-3563, 2005 WL 2050295, at *17 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 26, 2005).
12. Mullins, supra note 3, at 333-34. See generally Dick Act, ch. 196, § 14, 32
Stat. 775, 777 (1903) (repealed 1956).
13. Mullins, supra note 3, at 333-34.
14. Rendell, 2005 WL 2050295, at *17.
15. Mullins, supra note 3, at 334-35; see also National Defense Act of 1916, ch.
134, § 111, 39 Stat. 166, 197 (current version at 32 U.S.C. § 104(d)-(f) (2006)).
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ing National Guard forces in addition to this proscribed list.16
Even the power to locate these prescribed units is subject to
oversight from the federal government. 17 The power to appoint
and reappoint commissioned and warrant officers of the National Guard, a power explicitly granted to states by the Constitution, is subject to federal review.' 8 Of the remaining two
powers listed in Rendell, the power of the state governor to call
the National Guard to active duty during a state emergency is
perhaps the last remaining substantive state power over the
militia.19
II.

The National Guard and the BRAC Act

The final power listed in Rendell, namely the power to organize and reorganize National Guard units, is the subject of
this article and the target of recent intense judicial and legislative activity. 20 The recommendation for base closings, which
the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (hereinafter "BRAC Commission") forwarded to President George W.
Bush on September 8, 2005, catalyzed this debate and became
the case in controversy. 2 1 The BRAC Commission was established by the BRAC Act and initially provided for three periods
of realignment and base closure in 1991, 1993, and 1995.22 Congress then amended the Act to provide for a series of base clo16. Mullins, supra note 3, at 335-36. States are, however, allowed to maintain
a token self-defense force with no ties or obligations to the federal government.
See Act of August 11, 1955, ch. 802, 69 Stat. 686 (1955) (codified as amended at 32
U.S.C. § 109(c) (2006)).
17. An excellent example would be the power of the BRAC Commission to
close federally funded National Guard bases. See generally Base Closures and Realignment Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (2006) [hereinafter "BRAC Act"].
18. Power granted by U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. The requirement of federal review was established by National Defense Act of 1916.
19. Rendell, 2005 WL 2050395, at *17. This is the power famously invoked (or
not invoked) most recently by Governor Kathleen Babineaux-Blanco in response to
Hurricane Katrina. See generallyJ.L. Miller, Governors Want To Keep Guard Control, THE NEWS JOURNAL (Wilmington, DE), Aug. 21, 2006, at IA.
20. See generally Romney v. Rumsfeld, No. 0511821GAO, 2005 WL 2177118
(D. Mass. Sept. 8, 2005); Rendell, 2005 WL 2050295; Missouri. ex rel. Nixon v.
Rumsfeld, No. 4:05-CV-01387JCH, 2005 WL 2172392 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 7, 2005);
Bredesen v. Rumsfeld, No. 3:05-0640, 2005 WL 2175175 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 7,
2005); Blagojevich v. Rumsfeld, 385 F. Supp. 2d 768 (C.D. Ill 2005); Rell v. Rumsfeld, 389 F. Supp. 2d 395 (D. Conn. 2005).
21. As required by BRAC Act § 2912, 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (2006).
22. Rendell, 2005 WL 2050295, at *6.
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sures and realignment in 2005:23 "The purpose of the BRAC Act
is to "close or realign military installations that create an unnecessary drain on the economic resources of the Department of
Defense." 24 As part of this amendment to the BRAC Act, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld submitted a list of proposed
changes and realignments to the BRAC Commission on May 13,
2005.25 After making some revisions to the recommendations,
the BRAC Commission forwarded the recommendations to
President Bush on September 8, 2005. The President then had
26 If
until September 23, 2005 to review the recommendations.
the President had changes, a revision process would take place.
This process would end on October 20, 2005 with the President
approving the revisions or terminating the program without
adopting the changes. 27 In the alternative, the President could
either accept or not explicitly reject the changes by September
28 If
23, 2005, and the list would be transmitted to Congress.
Congress did not then explicitly reject the list within forty-five
days of receiving it, it would return to the Secretary of Defense
29
for implementation.
The list that was sent to the BRAC Commission on May 13,
2005 contained several recommendations that not only closed
state National Guard bases (as authorized by the BRAC Act),
but also effected explicit and in-fact reorganization of National
Guard units. 30 In several states, the recommendation involved
23. BRAC Act § 2912.
24. Bredesen, 2005 WL 2175175, at *1.
25. Rell, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 398; BRAC Act § 2912(e).
26. BRAC Act § 2914, 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (2006); see also Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Timeline, http://www.dod.mil/brac/docs/time05.pdf (last visited
Oct. 18, 2006).
27. Id. § 2914.
28. Id.
29. Id. § 2404.
30. Thirty-seven of forty-two Air Force proposals recommended by the Department of Defense involved the Air National Guard. These proposals would strip
twenty-three Guard units of all of their aircraft. See DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND
REALIGNMENT COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT iii (2005), availableat
http://www.brac.gov/finalreport.html#req [hereinafter COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS]. In regards to the three sources of ongoing litigation, the report to the Commission only explicitly called for the deactivation of one National Guard unit (the
111th fighter wing in Pennsylvania, the subject of Rendell, 2005 WL 2050295). Id.
The report called for the "realignment" of the Connecticut 103rd fighter wing
which stripped all of the unit's aircraft (the subject of Rell v. Rumsfeld, 389 F.
Supp. 2d 395 (D. Conn 2005)). Id. at 122. The report also proposed to change the

5

370

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:365

reorganizing entire Air National Guard units and moving all
the units' aircraft to another state. 3 1 Many of the affected state
governors saw this proposed action as an illegal infringement
on their statutory right to approve all changes in organization
32
of National Guard units located entirely within state borders.
In an effort to secure injunctions before the BRAC Commission
forwarded the list of recommendations to the President, six governors filed suit in federal district court. 33 Of the six suits filed,
two were able to obtain an injunction in district court, but one of
these was overturned the next day by the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals. 34 Only Governor Rendell of Pennsylvania was able
35
to secure and sustain an injunction.

flying mission for the Illinois 183rd fighter wing (the subject of Blagojevich v.
Rumsfeld, 385 F. Supp. 2d 768 (C.D. 11 2005)). Id. at 129.
31. See COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 30 and accompanying text
(even thought the wording of the specific recommendations varied, the effect was
the same: the reorganization of the affected units); see also Romney v. Rumsfeld,
No. 051182 1GAO, 2005 WL 2177118 (D. Mass Sept. 8, 2005); Rendell v. Rumsfeld,
No. 05-CV-3563, 2005 WL 2050295, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2005); Missouri. ex
rel. Nixon v. Rumsfeld, No. 4:05-CV-01387JCH, 2005 WL 2172392 (E.D. Mo. Sept.
7, 2005); Bredesen v. Rumsfeld, No. 3:05-0640, 2005 WL 2175175 (M.D. Tenn.
Sept. 7, 2005); Blagojevich, 385 F. Supp. 2d 768; Rell, 389 F. Supp. 2d 395.
32. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text; 32 U.S.C. § 104(c) (2006).
33. See Romney, 2005 WL 2177118; Rendell, 2005 WL 2050295; Nixon, 2005
WL 2172392; Bredesen, 2005 WL 2175175; Blagojevich, 385 F. Supp. 2d 768; Rell,
389 F. Supp. 2d 395. The governors relied on the Supreme Court case of Dalton v.
Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994), for the proposition that once the list was forwarded to
the President on September 8, 2005, they would be barred from review under the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1966), as the President was
not an agency subject to the Act. Even outside the APA, the President's decision
making was not subject to judicial review. See Rendell, 2005 WL 2050295, at *11.
In this series of cases, all but Rendell ultimately held that the recommendation to
the President was not a "final act" as required by the APA. In other words, no real
harm had yet been done and the issue was not ripe. The courts did reserve to the
states the right to bring an action once the harm (removal of the planes) became
imminent. See, e.g., Rell v. Rumsfeld, 423 F.3d 164, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2005).
34. Rell, 389 F. Supp. 2d 395, stay granted by 423 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2005)
35. Rendell, 2005 WL 2050295, at *21. The BRAC commission removed language calling for the dissolution of the 111th fighter wing, but proceeded to add
language which would retire or reassign all of the unit's aircraft. In an August
29th press conference, Governor Rendell called the development "disappointing."
Press Release, 2005 BRAC Threatens Air National Guard, http://www.pngas.net/
braclinks.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2006).
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On September 8, 2005, the BRAC Committee passed the
closure and reorganization list on to President Bush. 36 On September 15, 2005, President Bush then submitted the recommendations without change to Congress. 37 Congress then had fortyfive days in which to reject the recommendations, but failed to
act by the November 8, 2005 deadline. 38 Consequently, the recommendations then became effective. As of November 2005,
only three of the seven governors who originally filed suit had
plans of continuing to pursue legal action. 39 The federal government filed an appeal in late October 2005 to contest the stay
granted in federal district court to Governor Rendell of Pennsylvania. 40 Now that the BRAC recommendations are effective,
Governor Jodi Rell of Connecticut and Governor Rod
Blagojevich of Illinois are preparing to re-file the suits which
41
the respective district courts originally dismissed as unripe.
III. Rendell v. Rumsfeld
The suits filed by Governors Rell, Blagojevich, and Rendell
all make essentially the same claims. 42 Through the BRAC process, the federal government is attempting to disband or reorganize National Guard units that are entirely within a single
state. 43 The BRAC Act authorizes the federal government to
close National Guard bases. 44 The BRAC Act does not, however,
36. Base Realignment and Closure 2005 - U.S. Department of Defense, http:/!
www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2005/20050909_2657.html (last visited Jan. 23,
2007).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Mark K. Mathews, Govs Press Base Closing Lawsuits, STATELINE.ORG,
Nov. 2, 2005, http://www.stateline.org/liveNiewPage.action?siteNodeId=136&languageId=1&contentId=64428.
40. Id. (appeal has not yet been published). There is no indication that Governor Rendell plans to contest the removal of the aircraft of the 111th fighter wing.
Unlike Connecticut, Pennsylvania has two other fighter wings with aircraft. See
Press Release, 2005 BRAC Threatens Air National Guard, http://www.pngas.net/
braclinks.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2006).
41. Id.; Rell v. Rumsfeld, 389 F. Supp. 2d 395 (D. Conn. 2005); Blagojevich v.
Rumsfeld, 385 F. Supp. 2d 768 (C.D. Ill. 2005).
42. Rell, 389 F. Supp. 2d 395; Blagojevich, 385 F. Supp. 2d 768; Rendell v.
Rumsfeld, No. 05-CV-3563, 2005 WL 2050295 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2005).
43. Rell, 389 F. Supp. 2d 395; Blagojevich, 385 F. Supp. 2d 768; Rendell, 2005
WL 2050295.
44. BRAC Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (2006).
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explicitly give the federal government the authority to reorganize or change the makeup of the National Guard units. In fact,
32 U.S.C. § 104(c) requires the approval of the state governor
for any change to National Guard unit organization (called the
"proviso"). The district court in Rendell is the only court to date
to have extensively dealt with this apparent conflict of statutes.
Secretary Rumsfeld initially contended that the proviso in Section 104(c) did not apply to all changes in the branches, organization, or allotment of National Guard units, but only to the
subject matter of the proceeding sentence in the section (i.e., the
President's "designation of units combined to form higher tactical units.")45 The district court, using rules of statutory constriction and legislative history, determined that the proviso in
Section 104(c) does apply broadly to any change in organization
and therefore is applicable to changes made by the federal government in the context of the BRAC Act. 46 The court found as a
matter of law that the Secretary's recommendation that the
111th Fighter Wing be deactivated without Governor Rendell's
recommendation was in violation of 32 U.S.C. § 104(c).4 7 In the
alternative, Secretary Rumsfeld argued that the collateral reorganization or closing of National Guard units as a result of base
closure was implicitly authorized by the BRAC Act.48 He reasoned that in as much as there may be a conflict between the
BRAC Act and 32 U.S.C. § 104(c), the BRAC Act implicitly repealed Section 104(c) and compromised the governor's legal
right to approve the reorganization or elimination of a National
49
Guard unit.
To resolve this issue, the court embarked on an examination of conflict of laws. The court began from the proposition
that "repeals by implication are not favored," 50 then sought to
determine whether there was in fact an irreconcilable conflict
between the two statutes that would require the court to entertain the possibility of repeal. 51 In determining if the two stat45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Rendell, 2005 WL 2050295, at *15.
Id. at *17.
Id.
Id. at *18.
Id. at *17.

50. Id.
51. Id. at *18. "It is not enough to show that the two statutes produce differing results when applied to the same factual situation, for that no more than states
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utes were capable of co-existing, the court found that the BRAC
Act explicitly governed the closing of bases and the assignment
of civilian employees, but was conspicuously silent when it
came to the organization of National Guard units. 52 The court
reasoned that in light of this omission, it is unlikely that Congress intended to usurp the authority of the state governors on
this issue. 53 In contrast, Section 104(a) explicitly conferred the
power to approve organizational changes to the state
54
governor.
Under this reasoning there is no direct conflict of law and
the two statutes can co-exist. As such, there are no grounds to
find that the BRAC Act implicitly repealed the proviso in Section 104(c). 55 The court found that there were no genuine issues
of material fact that the Secretary's recommendation violated
Section 104(c) and the plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 56 The federal government currently
has a suit pending in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals regard57
ing this decision.
IV.

The Legal Background and Underpinnings of the
National Guard

In his Rendell opinion, Judge Padova found the roots of the
above-discussed conflict in the "very "princip les] of Federalism."55 Not only is the National Guard (in one form or another)
older than the nation itself, the Founding Fathers designed it to
operate on the same principles of federalism that form the
structure of the country. The National Guard serves a dual
function: it is both the militia, as laid out in the Constitution
under the command of the state governor, and also, when activated, a reserve component of the federal Army under the directhe problem. Rather, when two courts are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of
the courts .

.

. to regard each as effective." Id.

52. Id. at *19.
53. Id.
54. Id. at *17 ("Governor Rendell, as State commander in chief, does not share
his authority over the state National Guard with any federal entity").
55. Id. at *19.
56. Id. at *20.
57. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
58. Rendell, 2005 WL 2050295, at *2.
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tion of the President as Commander in Chief.59 When joining
the National Guard, soldiers and officers swear (or affirm) to
obey the orders of both the state governor and the President of
the United States. 60 This federal nature is at the center of the
over two hundred year long struggle for the power over the National Guard. In order to understand the importance of Rendell
and accompanying cases, it is important to understand the legal
origins and influences of the modern National Guard.
Today's National Guard traces its roots back to the early
colonial militias. 61 These various militias formed the Continental Army, which was largely responsible for winning American
independence from Great Britain. 62 When the country first attempted a national constitution in the guise of the Articles of
Confederation, the Framers left the control and the identity of
the militias solidly with the newly formed states. 63 However,
the Framers of the Constitution, in an attempt to forge a country with a stronger federal government, gave considerable attention to the fate of the state militias. 64 John Jay, one of the
chief Federalist proponents, was adamant in his belief that the
core of a strong county is a unified national militia. 65 Jay also
questioned the efficiency of the fragmented colonial militia system and its ability to deal with an organized attack. 66 Even
59. See generally id. Throughout this article "Army" is used to refer to the
armed forces as a whole. In the same manner, "National Guard" is used to refer to
the body that comprises the army, air, and naval components of the National
Guard. All of these components share common historical and legal roots.
60. National Defense Act of 1916, ch. 134, § 70, 39 Stat. 166.
61. See generally MICHAEL D. DOUBLER, I AM THE GUARD 17 (2001), available
at http://www.arng.army.mil/Publications/guardhistorybook.pdf.
62. Id. All colonies had a compulsory militia except for Pennsylvania, which
was settled largely by Quakers. Id.
63. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX, para. 5 (1777).
64. Hirsch, supra note 3, at 924.
65. See THE FEDERALIST No. 4, at 15 (John Jay) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001):
[A strong national government] can place the militia under one plan of discipline . . . consolidate them into one corps, and thereby render them more
efficient than if divided into thirteen ... independent companies.
What would the militia of Britain be, if the English militia obeyed the
government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the government of Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the government of Wales?
Id.
66. See id. at 16 ("If one [State militia] were attacked, would the others fly to
its succor, and spend their blood and money in its defence?").
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though the militias did cause the withdrawal of the British
forces from the colonies, many were critical of the militias' performance. 67 Alexander Hamilton, another Federalist, went one
step further and advanced the idea of a standing army. 68 However, the Framers as a whole were particularly uncomfortable
with the possible abuses of a standing peacetime army.69 Even
James Madison, who proposed a strong, federally controlled militia, stopped short of advocating a standing army.70 Ultimately, the debate at the Constitutional Convention concerning
the militia became one of degree: how much power should be
71
given to the federal government over the militia?
The Constitutional Convention eventually agreed to give
the federal government a list of enumerated powers, which are
known as the Militia Clauses. 72 Article I, Section 8, Clause 15
gives Congress the power to "provide for the calling forth of the
militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections
and repel invasions;" 73 and Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 gives
the Congress the power to
provide for the organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia,
and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the
Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively
the Appointment of Officers, and the Authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by congress ... .74
When the Constitution was put before the state conventions for ratification, concern arose in regards to Clause 15 in
particular. 75 The states were concerned with the specter of a
67. DOUBLER, supra note 61, at 63 ("To rely principally on the militia for national defense was to lean on a broken reed.").
68. See THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 122-26 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W.
Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) ("The steady operations of war against a
regular and discipline army can only be successfully conducted by a force of the
same kind ....

War, like most other things, is a science to be acquired and per-

fected by diligence, by perseverance, by time, and by practice." Id. at 125).
69. Hirsch, supra note 3, at 924.
70. JONATHAN ELLIOT, 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 378 (2d. ed. 1974).
71. Hirsch, supra note 3, at 924.
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15, 16.

73. Id. cl. 15.
74. Id. at 16.
75. Hirsch, supra note 3, at 929 (discussing the debates during the Virginia
ratifying convention, 1788).
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federally controlled force oppressing or actually invading the
sovereign states. 76 Eventually, most of the critics reasoned that
because the federal government was limited to three enumerated purposes when calling forth the militia, the federal power
was sufficiently limited. 77 Most also preferred a militia system
78
with some federal power to a powerful standing federal army.
The Founding Fathers considered it unlikely that state militias,
even under the control of the federal government, could ever be
used against the states. 79 Indeed, the militia was seen as the
counterbalance to the standing federal army, which was cau80
tiously authorized by the new Constitution.
Much of the development of the militia and the regular
Army in the ensuing decades and centuries was statutory. The
Act of 1789 is seen as the official birth of the two-tiered military
system. 8 ' This Act provided for a standing federal army distinct
from the state militia system. It also authorized the President
to draft the militia into service, although this provision ulti82
mately proved unnecessary.
The Federal Militia Act of 1792 established a federal accounting system that created a "documented and manageable
pool" from which the federal government could call up troops in
time of war.8 3 The Act also established a uniform military age
between eighteen and forty-five years of age.8 4 During the nineteenth century, the structure of the militia was left largely untouched. In 1903, however, largely in response to the United
States' increased presence in the international community,
Congress passed the Dick Act and repealed the Militia Act of
76. Id.
77. Id. at 930.
78. See THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 140-45 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W.
Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) (arguing that the militia would eliminate the
need for a standing army, or at least provide a security against a standing army
run amuck); see also Hirsch, supra note 3, at 924.
79. Hirsch, supra note 3, at 924.
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
81. See Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, 1 Stat. 95 (repealed 1790).
82. Hirsch, supra note 3, at 943-44 (large numbers of militia volunteered in
the war of 1812 and the Mexican-American war, even though these engagements
arguably fell outside of the federal government's three enumerated purposes for
calling up the militia).
83. See Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271.
84. Militia Act of 1792 § 1..
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1792.85 With the passage of the Dick Act, Congress exercised its
power under the Militia Clauses to organize the militia.8 6 The
state organized militia was now officially called the National
Guard,8 7 and the reserve militia, consisting of all males aged
eighteen to forty-five, was now a separate entity.88 The Dick
Act also authorized the federal government to provide funding
for training and equipment.8 9 It also provided for the training
of the militia by regular, federal army soldiers. 90 Along with the
support, however, came the predictable oversight. Militia
troops were now required to train fifteen days per calendar
year. 91 The Act also opened militia property books to federal
auditors and inspectors to insure that the states properly ap92
plied the funding.
The Militia Act of 1908 represented the first attempt by
Congress to use the militia overseas. 93 Prior to this Act, the militia was seen as a strictly defensive force, to be used in defense
of the country and its citizens. 94 For a short time, until the Militia Act was declared unconstitutional, Congress was able to fed95
eralize the National Guard for service anywhere in the world.
However, the Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Army, and
later the Attorney General, found no basis in the enumerated
powers of Clause 15 for sending the National Guard outside the
96
national borders for conditions short of actual warfare.
As World War One raged in Europe, Congress looked for a
way around the legal rulings that repealed the Militia Act of
1908. 97 Their answer was the National Defense Act of 1916
(NDA). 98 The NDA allowed the President to draft state Guard
85. The Dick Act, ch. 196, 32 Stat. 775 (1903). Section 25 of the Dick Act
repealed the Militia Act of 1792.
86. See id.
87. The Dick Act § 1.
88. DOUBLER, supra note 61, at 128.
89. The Dick Act § 3.
90. Id. § 20.
91. Mullins, supra note 3, at 334.
92. The Dick Act § 14; Mullins, supra note 3, at 334.
93. The Militia Act of 1908, Ch. 204, 35 Stat. 399.
94. Hirsch, supra note 3, at 931-34.
95. Mullins, supra note 3, at 334.
96. DOUBLER, supra note 61, at 137.
97. Mullins, supra note 3, at 334.
98. National Defense Act of 1916, ch. 134, 39 Stat. 166.
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troops into the federal Reserve. 99 Using this power, the President could draft entire state Guard units into the regular
Army. 0 0 This allowed Government to use the Clause 12 powers
instead of its powers under the Militia Clauses. 10 1 As federal10 2
ized troops, they could then be sent anywhere in the world.
Congress also used the NDA to further blur the organizational
line between the state Guard troops and the regular Army. The
Army was restructured to include both the standing federal
Army and the National Guard while in federal service.10 3 It also
defined the militia, as separate from the National Guard, to include all men aged eighteen to forty-five. 10 4 Every member of
the state Guard had to swear allegiance to the President, as
well as to the state governor. 0 5 Congress also approved new
funding for the state troops, as well as new restrictions on state
control. 0 6 Most notably, the federal government gained the
right to approve the commission of any state Guard officer
whose unit accepted federal funds. 10 7 The right to appoint their
own officers was a right reserved for the states explicitly in the
Constitution. 0 8 The Framers reasoned that a state militia with
state-selected officers would never become a puppet of the federal government and turn on the states. 10 9 While the states
technically still retained the ability to select state officers, this
function was stripped of all substantial power. 1 0 As a result of
the Act, the federal government now also dictated the type and
99. Id.

§ 111.

100. Mullins, supra note 3, at 335.
101. The federal government no longer had to "call out the militia" as they
could raise an army under Clause 12 language, which empowers Congress to draft
an army. This power is not encumbered by the three conditions stated in Clause
15 when calling out the militia. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, 15; Hirsch,
supra note 3, at 958.
102. Mullins, supra note 3, at 334.
103. National Defense Act §§ 57, 58; see also Mullins, supra note 3, at 335.
104. National Defense Act § 57.

105. Id. § 70.
106. Mullins, supra note 3, at 335.
107. National Defense Act § 75 ("The provisions of this act shall not apply to
any person hereinafter appointed an officer of the National Guard unless he first
shall have successfully passed such tests as to his physical, moral, and professional
fitness as the President shall proscribe.")
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
109. Hirsch, supra note 3, at 928.
110. National Defense Act of 1916, § 75.
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number of units a state was required to maintain."1 The Act
also prohibited states from maintaining units in addition to
those authorized by the national government. 112 In 1918, the
NDA survived a constitutional challenge on the grounds that it
gave the federal government powers beyond the scope of, Article

I, section 8, clause

15.113

In the case of Arver v. United States, the Supreme Court
held that the power of the federal government to call up the
militia was separate from the power to raise an army in time of
war. 1 4 It also held that using a selective draft to raise an army
from the militia in time of war was implicitly permitted by the
115
federal government's power to prosecute war.
The Army Reorganization Act gave the federal government
almost total oversight over the operation of the National
Guard. 11 6 This Act also established the Federal Bureau of the
Militia and gave it the power to control the geographic location
of the Guard. 117 The President could now activate the Guard
118
under federal control in the event of an emergency.
The Act of 1933 created the National Guard of the United
States, which was composed of state Guards in the service of
the United States. 119 In effect, this was the beginning of the
federal militia. During peacetime, the federal militia didn't really exist, but became a functional force in wartime. 120 Every
state Guardsman was now also a federal Reservist, and took an
121
oath as a member of both organizations.
The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 codified the modern
National Guard and Reserve system. 122 This Act provided for
111. National Defense Act § 60; see also Mullins, supra note 3, at 335.
112. National Defense Act § 60; see also Mullins, supra note 3, at 336.
113. Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (powers not within the three
enumerated powers of "repelling invasions, executing the laws of the union, and
suppressing insurrections." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15).
114. Id. at 384.
115. Id. at 378.
116. Army Reorganization Act, ch. 227, 41 Stat. 759 (1920) (repealed 1950).
117. Mullins, supra note 3, at 337.
118. Id.
119. Act of June 15, 1933, ch. 87, 48 Stat. 153; see also Mullins, supra note 3,
at 337.
120. Mullins, supra note 3, at 337.
121. DOUBLER, supra note 61, at 170.

122. Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, ch. 608, 66 Stat. 481 (largely
repealed).
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the Guard to be called out for federal service for fifteen days
each year subject, of course, to permission from the state governor. 123 The Act also struck what seemed like a viable compromise with regards to the federal power to call out the militia.
Under the language of the Act, the President could only call out
the state Guard for the three enumerated purposes under
Clause 15.124 For any reason outside the scope of Clause 15, the
125
President had to secure the permission of the state governor.
This compromise would have given the federal government the
actual power it needed to maintain a cohesive military structure going into the Cold War period while respecting the sensi126
bilities of the individual states.
The next two decades saw increased emphasis on the Reserve and National Guard components of the military. The doctrine that emerged in the 1970's was the "Total Force"
concept. 127 This concept relied on a smaller, all-volunteer regular army augmented by the United States Army Reserve and
the National Guard. 128 Now any conceivable major military engagement would rely heavily on the Army Reserve and National
Guard units' ability to quickly mobilize and deploy. 129 This increased national role for the state Guard was necessarily met
with a decrease in its state role. The principal role of the Guard
had become one of a reserve force for the President. No longer
was the Guard a state militia force with a secondary mission of
130
federalizing in time of war.
The next major development in the legal structure and control of the National Guard occurred in the early 1980's. During
123.
124.
125.
126.

Armed Forces Reserve Act § 233(c).
See Mullins, supra note 3, at 338; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
See Mullins, supra note 3, at 338.
Id.

127. DOUBLER, supra note 61, at 240.

128. Id. Much of this change in emphasis was caused by the post-Vietnam
political climate that favored both a smaller military and a smaller military
budget.
129. Id., at 242. Starting in 1970, most active duty combat divisions were
made up of two active duty brigades and one "roundout" brigade, which was a National Guard brigade that would join the division in time of war. Id. at 240-41.
130. Of course, this period also saw unprecedented use of National Guard
troops by state governors to respond to riots and other incidences of domestic violence. Examples include the 1965 Watts Riots in Los Angeles 1965, the 1967 Riots
in Detroit, and the incident at Kent State University in 1970. See DOUBLER, supra
note 61, at 226-29.
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this period, the federal government began using the prescribed
fifteen-day federal active-duty training period to send National
Guard troops to Central America. During these training missions, National Guard troops were used to build bridges and
roads, but they also took part in military maneuvers with Central American armed forces. 131 Several state governors saw
these "training missions" as an attempt to bully and influence
local politics. 13 2 In response, they threatened to exercise the
power reserved to them by the Armed Forces Reserve Act of
1952 and withhold their consent to allow their state Guard
troops to train on federal active duty outside the national borders.1 33 Hoping to avoid this confrontation, Congressman
Sonny Montgomery introduced an amendment as part of the
1986 Defense Authorization Act.134 Known as the Montgomery
Amendment, this proviso effectively rescinded the right of state
governors to withhold their consent "because of any objection to
35
the location, purpose, right, or schedule of such active duty."'
After the amendment passed, Minnesota Governor Rudy
Perpich filed suit in federal court to declare the amendment unconstitutional. 3 6 The Supreme Court held that the gubernatorial consent requirement of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of
1952 was not constitutionally required. 37 The Court reasoned
that because members of the National Guard were really members of both the state and federal National Guards, they were
no longer a part of the state militia while on their federal active
duty training. 138 As such, the federal government was within
its power to train these federal troops both within the United
States and without. 139 The Court did reserve for the governors
131. Id. at 255; see also Mullins, supra note 3, at 339.
132. DOUBLER, supra note 61, at 255.
133. Id.
134. Mullins, supra note 3, at 340.
135. Perpich v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 880 F.2d 11, 33 (8th Cir. 1989).
136. Id.
137. Keith Highet, George Kahale, III & David J. Scheffer, National Guard
TrainingMissions Outside United States-FederalControlOver National Guard"Militia"Clauses of U.S. Constitution-"MontgomeryAmendment," 84 AM. J. INT'L
L. 914, 918 (1990); see also Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, ch. 608, 66 Stat. 481
(largely repealed).
138. Perpich v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 348 (1989).
139. Highet et al., supra note 137, at 918; see also Perpich v. U.S. Dep't of
Def., 880 F.2d 11, 17 (8th Cir. 1989)..
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the truncated right to veto the federal use of state Guard troops
if the training mission interfered with the governor's ability to

respond to local emergencies .140
In a concession to the states, federal law has authorized
states to maintain their own defense forces separate from the
National Guard. 4 1 This defense force cannot be drafted into
federal service, and its members are not dually enrolled in any
federal body.142 This provision is in recognition of the radical
shift in organization and mission which has transformed the
militia from the backwoods Minutemen of the colonial period to
the federal Reserve force that the National Guard is today.
In the most recent attempt by the federal government to
extend its authority over the National Guard, the House of Representatives' version of the 2007 Defense Authorization Bill
passed with a provision that would allow the President to feder1 43
alize the National Guard to respond to national disasters.
While the Senate version of the bill does not include the provision, the House-Senate Conference Committee has yet to approve a final version. 4 4 In an unprecedented show of bipartisan
support, all fifty-one state governors signed a letter dated August 1, 2006 and addressed to the Senate and House Committees opposing the measure. 45 Arkansas Governor Mike
Huckabee called the measure part of a larger federal effort designed to make states "satellites of the national government,"
and also claimed that the measure "violate[d] more than 200
years of American history."1 46 The Adjunct General of the Delaware Guard, General Frank Vavala, called the measure
140. Highet et al., supra note 137, at 918; see also Perpich, 880 F.2d at 17.
During the relief effort in response to Hurricane Katrina, there was some grumbling among gulf state administrations that too many of their National Guard
troops were in Iraq and Afghanistan to effectively deal with the situation. See Liz
Sidotti, Guard Stretched Between Katrina, Wars, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 10,
2005, available at http://www.mfso.org/article.php?id=362.
141. Act of Aug. 11, 1955, ch. 802, 69 Stat. 686 (codified as amended at 32
U.S.C. § 109(c) (2006)).
142. Act of Aug. 11, 1955 (amending Section 61 of the National Defense Act of
1916, ch. 134, 39 Stat. 166, by addition of subsection "(b)").
143. Kelly Beaucar Vlahos, Congress Debates Giving White House Broader
Authority Over National Guard, Fox NEWS.COM, Sept. 14, 2006, http://www.fox
news.com/ (search for "congress debates white house national guard").
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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"counter to the [U.S.] Constitution and the [Clonstitutional
[M]ilitia [C]lause, which of course gives the governor the au147
thority over the National Guard."
It seems clear that the measure is an attempt by the White
House to increase its control over available disaster relief resources in the wake of a poor federal showing during the Hurricane Katrina disaster. However, Delaware Governor Ruth Ann
Minner, was quick to point out that state-directed relief efforts
were among the most responsive in the aftermath of the hurricane. 148 Because the National Guard was under her control, she
was able to dispatch troops to Mississippi within about twenty
hours; 149 after the Governor of Mississippi made the request,
the Governor of Delaware was able to respond quickly, without
any federal interference. 15 0 General Vavala added, "[wle were
able to support our colleagues in Mississippi and Louisiana and
did a magnificent job in doing so. I think our [F]ounding
[Flathers had it right: If it ain't broken, don't fix it." 51 Governor
Minner saw the federal inroads on state power as not only unconstitutional, but unnecessary, stating, "I cannot imagine any
governor turning down the [P] resident where there is a real
52
need."1
Although most think it unlikely that the provision will find
its way into the final version of the bill, the incident is indicative of where the legal momentum lies in the power struggle
over the National Guard. This measure passed the House of
Representatives 396 to 31 before the issue attracted any real
1 53
attention or debate.
V. Possible Outcomes and Resulting Implications for Rendell
Today, state governors have very little real power over
their National Guard troops. 5 The state governor no longer
147. J.L. Miller, Governors Want To Keep Guard Control, THE NEWS JOURNAL
(Wilmington, DE), Aug. 21, 2006, at 1A.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
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has control over the commissioning of officers. 155 State governors cannot dictate what kind of troops and units will make up
their National Guard troops, nor where in the state they will be
billeted. 156 Governors have no control over the budget and the
equipment of their National Guard troops, 57 nor any say over
when the federal government will call their National Guard
troops or units to active duty for training missions, for emergency, or in time of war.'58 In fact, the only remaining powers
governors do have is their ability to refuse to send troops on
training missions if faced with a state emergency and the right
under 32 U.S.C. § 104(c) to have approval authority for a
59
change in organization of a National Guard unit.
The legal system has been consistently chipping away the
state control of the militia, seemingly in the face of both the
express language of the Constitution and the intent of the
Founding Fathers. 60 A prime example is the National Defense
Act's stripping of the governors' right to appoint National
Guard (militia) officers. 16' No provision could be more explicitly
stated in the Constitution: the right to appoint officers in the
state militia is specifically reserved to the states. 62 If past history is any indicator, these remnants of state power regarding
the National Guard will not last long.
The question that will shortly be before the Second and
Eight Circuit Courts of Appeal is a symbolic fight for the respective governors, and probably little else. If the Circuits find the
logic of District Judge John Padova in Rendell unconvincing
and hold that the authority to re-organize National Guard
155. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 15.
157. See supra notes 12, 15, 17, and accompanying text.
158. See Mullins, supra note 3, at 335-38.
159. See Rendell v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-CV-3563, 2005 WL 2050295, at *17 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 26, 2005); see also 32 U.S.C. 104(c) (2006).
160. See Perpich v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 880 F.2d 11, 18 (8th Cir. 1989) (Heaney, J., dissenting):
With a few strokes of the word processor, the majority has written the Militia Clause out of the United States Constitution. In so doing, it contradicts
the clear intent of the founding fathers, who believed that state control over
elements of the military was essential to a free and peaceful republic.

Id.
161. National Defense Act of 1916 § 75, ch. 134, 39 Stat. 166.

162. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
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Units lies with the federal government, there will be no great
shift of power in the federalist balance. 163 If the courts find for
the states and hold 32 U.S.C. § 104(c) applicable and superior to
the authority granted to the BRAC Commission by the BRAC
Act, the victory may be a hollow one. In fact, the governors
bringing suit over the actions of the 2005 BRAC Commission
may find they have a lot in common with Governor Perpich.
Perpich tried to exercise his statutory rights as the commander
in chief of the state National Guard troops only to find the
power stripped away by the Montgomery Amendment. 164 The
right of state governors to approve changes to the organization
of National Guard units is statutory. While the authority does
have roots in the Constitution, the Militia Clauses are broad
enough to leave room for interpretation. 65 Congress can easily
repeal 32 U.S.C. § 104(c) if the courts interpret the statute in a
manner unfavorable to its interest. 66 After all, the Constitution specifically states that the appointing of militia officers is
expressly reserved for the states, and yet this is power has been
effectively legislated away by Congress. 16 7 While such a repeal

will eventually have to withstand a constitutional challenge,
the legal momentum in this eventuality would seem to be
against the state governors.
The most likely outcome of the Rell and Rendell decisions is
a short term compromise that keeps the issue from the Circuit
courts all together. In one scenario, the federal government
might offer the Air National Guards of Pennsylvania and Connecticut an alternative flying mission, more in line with the
federal comprehensive defense plan. In such a compromise, the
governors would retain a flying mission for their state Air National Guards, and in return would approve the new restructuring and drop the suits. While a compromise would solve the
immediate problem, it would leave the underlying question for
another case and another court.

163.
164.
165.
166.

See supra notes 11-18.
See Perpich, 880 F.2d at 11.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
See Rendell v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-CV-3563, 2005 UL 2050295, at *17-19

(E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2005).
167. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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As the eventual disposition of the issue seems a forgone
conclusion, the question remains as to whether development of
the law and the shifting of power from the states to the federal
government is a healthy adaptation to the changing times, or a
harmful contradiction of the Founders' intent. The BRAC Commission would argue that giving state governors the power to
derail a money-saving and efficiency-promoting exercise like
the BRAC process is not in the country's best interest. It is the
job of governors to protect the interests of their constituents,
not necessarily the interests of the country as a whole. The National Guard, its equipment, and its bases are a vital component
of national security and should therefore be controlled by the
168
federal government.
However, the intent of the Framers with respect to the
state militias is remarkably clear. The National Guard of the
twenty-first century is perhaps the embodiment of everything
the Framers were attempting to avoid with the Militia
Clauses. 169 The Framers styled the militia as the grass-roots
foil for the standing federal Army. 170 Its very function was to
protect the states from an overreaching federal government.
The National Guard of the twenty-first century has been substantially appropriated by the federal Army, and now serves as
its Reserve force.' 7' With the possible exception of the Article I
references to slavery, there is not a more striking instance of a
direct, modern-day violation of both the letter and the spirit of
the Constitution.
Of course, legislation can be in contradiction with the
Framers' intent and still be in the best interests of the country.
The modern National Guard may seem better used as a reserve
force and a state-controlled, federally-coordinated, emergency
response force than as a bulwark against the federal government. In recent years the National Guard has seen extensive
service in both of these capacities. In the aftermath of September 11th, 2001, National Guard troops from the 115th, the
290th, and the 200th regiments secured the grounds of the Pen168. DOUBLER, supra note 61, at 240.
169. See supra notes 63-64 and 67-70.
170. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
171. DOUBLER, supra note 61, at 240.
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tagon. 172 Over 3000 were on duty within three days, and over
5000 within ten days, as part of operation Noble Eagle. 173 During the course of this operation, National Guard troops were
also responsible for the security of nuclear power plants, domestic water supply, bridges, tunnels, and other sensitive infrastructure. 174 Air National Guard fighter aircraft maintained a
constant presence in the skies over both Washington, D.C. and
New York City. 175 In total, 206,587 National Guard soldiers
and airmen saw active duty from September 11, 2001, to Sep76
tember 1, 2005, in support of operation Noble Eagle.
The largest domestic deployment of National Guard troops
in the country's history occurred in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina.177 Within twenty-four hours of Katrina's upgrade to
Category Three status, the governor of Louisiana had 2000 National Guard troops on active duty; this number rose to 4000
within forty-eight hours. 7 8 As the eye of the storm moved inland, National Guard helicopters and rescue crews were the
first responders on site.1 79 In total, the National Guard activated 50,087 troops and 146 helicopters in response to the hurricane, some 20,000 more than the next largest deployment (in
response to the 1906 San Francisco earthquake). 8 0 Other recent domestic deployments of the National Guard include: 4000
troops during the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City,
Utah; 4870 troops during the June 2004 G-8 summit in Savannah, Georgia; 1614 troops during the 2004 Democratic National
Convention in Boston, Massachusetts; and 1297 troops during
8
the 2004 Republican National Convention in New York City.' '
It is the standardizing influence of the federal government that
makes these feats of coordination possible.
172. NATIONAL GUARD HOMELAND

DEFENSE WHITE

PAPER: SEPTEMBER 11,

2001, HURRICANE KATRINA, AND BEYOND 2-3 (2005), available at http://www.arng
.army.mil/Publications/HLD%20White%2Paperl 1OCT05_FinalVersion.pdf.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 3.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 4.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 6.
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The National Guard's already prominent role as the reserve
component of the standing, regular Army is likely to expand.
Americans have been unwilling to pay the high price of a large
standing army when the maintenance of a reserve force is considerably less expensive.1 8 2 While a reserve force is not as effective as a regular force in the early stages of a war, American
society has in the past committed itself to the war effort with
such fervor that the gap has been quickly overcome. 8 3 When a
reserve force is not enough, American society has filled the gap
with volunteers or conscription. 8 4 By 2010, the Army National
Guard will comprise 54% of the country's combat forces. 8 5
Again, it is only the close control of the federal government that
allows the country to rely so heavily upon the National Guard.
The question remains whether there is any place for the old
idea of a militia that serves as a counterbalance for a standing
federal army in the twenty-first century. The idea of protecting
one's state from the encroachments of the federal government
certainly seems to be at odds with the realities of the modern
era. The country bears little resemblance to the confederation
of sovereign states that comprised the United States in the
eighteenth century. Even the name "United States" is now a
singular term when it used to be a plural describing many individual sovereign bodies. And yet we are not one homogeneous
nation. The presidential election of 2004 made it clear that
there are very real differences between the citizens of the various states. A comparison of the political blue state/red state
map of the 2004 election and the slave state/free state map of
1860 shows opinion still breaks sharply along state lines. Liberal Democrats live predominately in urban, coastal areas,
while conservative Republicans are increasingly concentrated
in rural southern or mid-western states. 8 6 As long as there is
such an ideological divide, there is a place, at least in principle,
for a state militia governed by the states. Even though a repeat
of Fort Sumter is improbable, an eventual confrontation of some
182. DOUBLER, supra note 61, at 343.

183. See id.
184. Id.
185. ARMy NATIONAL GUARD VISION 2010, at 1 (2005), available at http://www

.arbg.army.mil/publications/201OIntroduction.pdf.
186. Steve Schifferes, Election Reveals Divided Nation, BBC NEWS, Nov. 3,

2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/3973197.stm.
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kind between federal and state governments seems probable.
As the federal government finds it harder and harder to sit the
fence on issues like abortion and stem cell research, the disfavored may find a use for the idea of state sovereignty, and the
institutions that go along with it.
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